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Introduction
A decomposition of a binary treatment (e.g., policy intervention) into extensive and intensive margin effects is of special interest when studying economic outcomes with a corner solution at zero.
1 Economic outcomes with corner solutions include health expenditures, working hours, and trade volumes. The average effect of a treatment on an outcome with a corner solution at zero can be decomposed into 1) the average change in the outcome of those with a positive outcome irrespective of treatment (always-takers or participants), plus 2) the average outcome of those with a positive outcome in the case of treatment and a zero outcome in the case of no treatment, minus 3) the average outcome of those with a zero outcome in the case of treatment and a positive outcome in the case of no treatment (Lee, 2012 (Lee, , 2017 Staub, 2014) . Part 1) represents the weighted causal intensive margin effect. The sum of 2) and 3) captures the weighted causal extensive margin effect.
2
Even if treatment is randomly assigned, a mean comparison of treatment and control groups with positive outcomes does not identify the causal intensive margin effect without additional assumptions (Angrist, 2001 ). This can be illustrated by the following example. Consider an experiment in which the outcome of interest is health expenditure.
A randomly assigned treatment group receives an insurance contract with a low copayment rate and a control group receives a contract with a high copayment rate. Suppose we are interested in the treatment effect of those having positive health expenditure irrespective of whether they face a high or a low copayment rate (intensive margin effect).
The sample of individuals with positive health expenditure consists of two groups: 1) the group of individuals with positive health expenditure irrespective of whether they face a high or a low co-payment rate; and 2) the group of individuals with positive health expenditure only because they face a low copayment rate, who would have zero health expenditure if they faced a high copayment rate. For the causal intensive margin effect, we are only interested in the first group. Group membership, however, is not observed in 1 Corner solutions at alternative thresholds are possible as well. For simplicity and illustration, we consider the case where the threshold is at zero.
2 The weights are given by the relative size of the group in the population.
the data, because we observe either the outcome in the case of treatment or the outcome in the case of no treatment. The unobserved characteristics of the two groups are likely to be different. On average, individuals in the second group are likely to be in better health than individuals in the first group because they exhibit zero health expenditure when facing the high copayment rate. Therefore, health expenditure in the first group is likely to be higher than in the second group. As a result, a mean comparison conditional on positive health expenditure does not have a causal interpretation due to a potential selection bias.
The literature on policy evaluation has developed well established methods to deal with selection problems. The list of methods includes difference-in-difference, instrumental variable, regression discontinuity, control function approaches, and matching. For this
reason, it appears appropriate to use these methods to overcome the potential selection bias and estimate the causal intensive margin effect.
In this paper, we discuss difference-in-difference methods to estimate the causal intensive margin effect in a setting with random treatment.
3 In contrast to standard difference-in-difference estimators, we condition on individuals with positive outcomes.
4
We derive sufficient conditions under which the causal intensive margin effect is identified.
Analogous to the standard difference-in-difference literature, we discuss the treatmentversus-control, the pre-versus-post, and the difference-in-difference estimator. Moreover, we discuss how the identifying assumptions can be motivated.
This paper is related to the literature on models for non-negative outcomes with a mass point at zero. This includes Tobit models (McDonald & Moffitt, 1980; Tobin, 1958) , two-part models (Cragg, 1971; Duan, Manning, Morris, & Newhouse, 1983) , and selection models (Heckman, 1979) . Moreover, the paper is closely related to the literature employing principal stratification following Frangakis and Rubin (2002) to study causal extensive and intensive margin treatment effects for variables with nonnegative outcomes (Lee, 2012 (Lee, , 2017 Staub, 2014) . This literature decomposes the average treatment ef-fect into a population-weighted sum of treatment effects on participants and switchers.
5
Studying outcomes with a corner solution at zero, Staub (2014) derives nonparametric bounds for the treatment effects on participants and switchers. He further discusses point identification of causal intensive and extensive margin effects in censored regression, selection, and two-part models. Lee (2012 Lee ( , 2017 analyzes total, extensive, and intensive margin effects in general sample selection models, with the corner solution outcome as a special case. Lee (2012) analyzes nonparametric methods to estimate extensive and intensive margin effects, whereas Lee (2017) comparison is often applied in two-part models to estimate the intensive margin effect.
Therefore, this paper clarifies in which cases estimates of two-step estimators possess a causal interpretation.
A decomposition into extensive and intensive margin effects can provide valuable information for policy design. Take as an example the effect of the introduction of a partial retirement policy. Suppose that in the status quo, individuals must withdraw the full pension at a given age, but are allowed to continue working. Under the partial retirement policy, individuals have the choice between a partial and a full pension, and are allowed to continue working. The total effect on labor supply of such a policy may be zero or negative, suggesting that the policy has been ineffective. 6 The zero result, however, could be explained by a positive extensive margin effect that was offset by a negative intensive margin effect. Older workers who would have retired in the absence of a partial retirement policy now decide to stay in the labor market. Likewise, individuals who would have worked full-time in the absence of a partial retirement policy, decide to work part-time. The welfare effect of such a policy may be positive through retained human capital, although the total effect on labor supply is small.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe how the intensive margin effect is embedded in the causal decomposition based on potential outcomes. Identification of the causal intensive margin effect is described in section 3.
In section 4 we discuss how the identifying assumptions can be verified. The last section concludes the paper.
2 Causal decomposition of a treatment effect
Notation and setup
We consider the standard potential outcomes framework with a non-negative outcome Y and a binary treatment D (Rubin, 1974) . Each individual i is endowed with two Observed outcomes are denoted without superscript; that is Y i,t and Y i,t−1 . As an implication of random treatment assignment, treatment is independent of joint potential
Causal decomposition
We define four exhaustive and mutually exclusive subgroups based on the joint distribution of potential outcomes in period t following Lee (2012) and Staub (2014) :
Based on this definition, we decompose the average treatment effect (ATE) at time t as follows:
The terms in lines (2) and (3) 
Identification
We are interested in the causal intensive margin effect
We derive sufficient conditions under which the causal intensive margin effect is identified in difference-in-difference methods on positive outcomes. Analogous to the standard difference-in-difference literature, we discuss the treatment-versus-control, the pre-versuspost, and the difference-in-difference estimator.
Treatment-versus-control estimator on positive outcomes
The treatment-versus-control estimator on positive outcomes is given by the difference in conditional expectation of treated and untreated individuals with positive outcomes
Proposition 1 (Identification treatment-versus-control estimator on positive outcomes).
Sufficient conditions to identify the causal intensive margin effect using the treatmentversus-control estimator on positive outcomes are:
1. Stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) (assumption 1), and 2. no switchers (assumption 2). Or 1. SUTVA (assumption 1), and 2. conditional mean independence (assumption 3).
Assumption 1 (SUTVA). The stable unit treatment value assumption is given by
∀i, and
where D i ∈ {0, 1} denotes treatment status.
The SUTVA ensures that we actually observe the potential outcomes in the treatment and control groups. The SUTVA implies that the observed outcome of individual i only depends on the potential outcomes and the treatment status D i , but not on the treatment status D j of any other individual j. Thus, SUTVA rules out general equilibrium effects and spill-over effects.
Assumption 2 (No switchers). The assumption of no switchers is given by
The assumption of no switchers states that the potential outcome in the case of treatment is positive if and only if the potential outcome in the case of no treatment is positive.
It therefore excludes the possibility that individuals have a positive outcome in the case of treatment and a zero outcome in the case of no treatment (switchers 1), or vice versa (switchers 2).
Assumption 3 (Conditional mean independence). The assumption on conditional mean independence is given by
, and
The assumption of conditional mean independence states that the expected potential outcome in the case of treatment of switchers 1 is equal to the expected potential outcome in the case of treatment of participants. Furthermore, the expected potential outcome in the case of no treatment of switchers 2 is equal to the expected potential outcome in the case of no treatment of participants.
Proof. Under SUTVA and random treatment, and by the law of iterated expectations, equation (6) can be rewritten as 
Pre-versus-post estimator on positive outcomes
The pre-versus-post estimator on positive outcomes is given by the difference in the conditional expectations between pretreatment and posttreatment outcomes for treated individuals with positive outcomes in both periods
Proposition 2 
Assumption 4 (No anticipation). The no anticipation assumption is given by
The no anticipation assumption states that in expectation, individuals with a positive outcome in both periods in the case of treatment do not differ in their potential outcomes in period t−1. Hence, in expectation, individuals do not change their behavior depending on their treatment status in period t−1 in anticipation of their treatment between period t − 1 and t.
Assumption 5 (Treatment monotonicity at the extensive margin). The treatment monotonicity at the extensive margin assumption is given by
The assumption of treatment monotonicity at the extensive margin states that a positive outcome in the case of treatment implies a positive outcome in the case of no treatment or vice versa. Therefore, the treatment response is monotone with respect to the extensive margin decision. Note that this assumption only restricts the sign of the extensive margin effect. Thus, given the potential outcome in the case of treatment is positive, the potential outcome in the case of no treatment is allowed to be higher or lower than the potential outcome in the case of treatment. The assumption only requires that the potential outcome in the case of no treatment is positive. The assumption of treatment monotonicity at the extensive margin is weaker than the no switchers assumption because treatment monotonicity at the extensive margin allows for one type of switchers (either switchers 1 or switchers 2).
Assumption 6 (Time monotonicity at the extensive margin). The time monotonicity at the extensive margin assumption is given by
The assumption of time monotonicity at the extensive margin states that a positive outcome in period t implies a positive outcome in period t − 1, both in the cases of treatment and no treatment. Thus, we assume that there are no individuals participating in period t who are not participating in period t − 1. This assumption only restricts the sign of the extensive margin effect. Thus, given the potential outcome in period t is positive, the potential outcome in period t − 1 is allowed to be higher or lower than the potential outcome in period t.
Assumption 7 (No time trend in positive outcomes). The assumption of no time trend
in positive outcomes is given by
The assumption of no time trend in positive outcomes states that there is no time trend in the expected potential outcome in the case of no treatment of those with positive outcome in both periods in the case of treatment.
Proof. Under SUTVA and random treatment assignment, equation (7) Using time and treatment monotonicity at the extensive margin, the conditioning set can
Difference-in-difference estimator on positive outcomes
The difference-in-difference estimator on positive outcomes combines the aforementioned estimators and is given by the difference of differences 
7 By the time monotonicity at the extensive margin, the conditioning set can be reduced to E(Y
. Using the treatment monotonicity at the extensive margin, this term can be expanded to
The common trend in positive outcomes assumption represents the key assumption for identification. The common trend in positive outcomes assumption is closely related to the standard common trend assumption, 8 except that we require the common trend to hold between two specific subgroups: the subgroup with a positive outcome in both periods in the case of treatment, and the subgroup with a positive outcome in both periods in the case of no treatment.
Proof. Assuming SUTVA and random treatment, equation (8) can be rewritten to
Adding and subtracting E(Y
equation (9) and rearranging yields
Assuming common trend in positive outcomes, the sum of the two terms in line (12) and (13) 
Graphical derivation Figure 1 illustrates the derivation. It is critical to note that even though treatment is randomly assigned, the expected outcomes of treatment and control groups with positive outcomes in periods t and t − 1 are possibly different in period t − 1. This is due to conditioning on positive outcomes in both periods t and t − 1. For illustration purposes, 8 In the standard difference-in-difference, the common trend assumption is given by
we specify the expected outcome of the control group in both t and t − 1 to be above the expected outcome of the treatment group.
As an example, consider the partial retirement policy from the introduction. Individuals reach the retirement age between period t − 1 and t. Suppose that in the control group, individuals must claim the full pension at a given age (retirement age) but are allowed to continue working. Continued work does not increase future pension entitlements. Individuals in the treatment group have the choice between a partial and a full pension. A partial pension can be claimed if they reduce their working hours. If they claim a partial pension, continued work increases their future pensions. Therefore, individuals in the control group have strong incentives to leave the labor market at the retirement age, whereas individuals in the treatment group have incentives to work parttime after reaching the retirement age. In period t, individuals in the treatment group have lower working hours compared with individuals in the control group. Individuals in the treatment group face partial retirement incentives and therefore continue working, but with reduced working hours. In period t − 1, no individual is treated. Individuals in the treatment group, however, are likely to have lower working hours in period t − 1 compared with individuals in the control group. Control group individuals with a positive outcome in period t participate in the labor market, although they have strong incentives to leave the labor market. Therefore, control group individuals working in both periods are likely to have a higher attitude toward work and tend to work more than treatment group individuals working in both periods.
The four bold dots in the upper graph of Figure 1 depict the observed quantities.
In A , SUTVA and random treatment implies that the observed quantity is equal to 
Verification of identifying assumptions
With the exception of the time monotonicity at the extensive margin assumption, we cannot directly test the identifying assumptions. Instead, we propose alternative tests that can be used to motivate the identifying assumptions.
10 Table 1 provides an overview of the assumptions for identification of the causal intensive margin effect by the estimators presented in section 3. Moreover, Table 1 summarizes the alternative tests that aim to motivate the identifying assumptions.
1) SUTVA:
This assumption cannot be tested. One has to evaluate whether general equilibrium effects and spill-over effects between individuals are sufficiently small.
2) No switchers:
The no switchers assumption cannot be directly tested. Alternatively, one can perform a test that the difference in the fraction with positive outcomes between the treatment and control groups; that is,
sufficiently close to zero. Under SUTVA and random treatment assignment, this term can be rewritten in terms of potential outcomes:
is sufficiently close to zero, this does not rule out the case in which the proportion of switchers 1 and switchers 2 are positive and equal; that is P (Y
. In this case, we could mistakenly conclude that no switchers are present.
3) Conditional mean independence: This assumption cannot be tested using observed outcomes. Alternatively, one can compare pretreatment outcomes of the treatment and control groups with positive outcomes in period t and t − 1; that is, E(
. Thereby, we test whether A and C in Figure 1 are congruent. As described in the example with partial retirement of the graphical derivation in section 3.3, congruent outcomes in period t − 1 indicate that unobserved characteristics of treatment group and control group with positive outcome 10 We cannot rule out the possibility that a given identifying assumption is violated even though the alternative test is not able to reject the null hypothesis that the assumption is fulfilled. The opposite is also possible. A given identifying assumption could be fulfilled, even if the alternative test rejects the null that the assumption is fulfilled. 
Must be motivated by economic theory.
6) Time monotonicity at ext. margin
sufficiently close to zero.
7) No time trend in positive outcomes
x No 1) E(Y i,t − Y i,t−1 |Y i,t > 0, Y i,t−1 > 0, D i = 0) sufficiently close to zero. 2) E(Y i,t−1 − Y i,t−2 |Y i,t > 0, Y i,t−1 > 0, Y i,t−2 > 0, D i = 1) sufficiently close to zero.
8) Common trend in positive outcomes
Note: Treatment-versus-control estimator on positive outcomes (TC), pre-versus-post estimator on positive outcomes (PP), difference-in-difference estimator on positive outcomes (DiD). *Either no switchers or conditional mean independence must hold.
in period t − 1 and t are similar.
4) No anticipation:
The no anticipation assumption is not directly testable using observed outcomes. One can, however, inspect the difference in unconditional expectation in the pretreatment period; that is, E(Y i,t−1 |D i = 1) − E(Y i,t−1 |D i = 0).
5) Treatment monotonicity at the extensive margin:
The assumption of treatment monotonicity at the extensive margin cannot be tested using observed outcomes. Economic theory must be used to argue whether the assumption is fulfilled. 
Conclusion
This paper extends the literature on the identification of causal intensive margin effects.
We borrow difference-in-difference methods from the policy evaluation literature to identify the causal intensive margin effect in a setting with random treatment assignment.
We derive sufficient conditions under which the treatment-versus-control estimator on positive outcomes, the pre-versus-post estimator on positive outcomes, and the differencein-difference estimator on positive outcomes identify the causal intensive margin effect.
Furthermore, we discuss how the identifying assumptions can be motivated.
We show that the treatment-versus-control estimator on positive outcomes, often applied in two-part models, provides a causal estimate if there are no switchers or if conditional mean independence holds. We show that the difference-in-difference estimator on positive outcomes, compared to the standard difference-in-difference estimator, additionally requires time and treatment monotonicity at the extensive margin. Although we focus on the setting with random treatment, the methods discussed in this paper could be extended to a setting in which treatment is as good as randomly assigned conditional on observables.
